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FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE
"Not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate".
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes (1929).
By
EMILY MARX*
|More than one of the societal "advances" to which we now point with pride
was a "thought hated" by many Americans when it was first expressed; hated
with such frenzied, maniacal hate that its proponents were branded traitors and
public enemies. Here are a few examples from the law reports.
Workmen's compensation, said the highest court in the State of New York
in 1911, is based on economic and sociologic arguments which "subvert the fundam'ental idea of property". If these be countenanced, "there is no private right
entirely safe, because there is no limitation upon the absolute discretion of legislatures, and the guarantees of the Constitution are a mere waste of words; tlle
legislature will next say to the man of wealth 'you have more property than you
need and your neighbor is so poor that he can barely subsist; in the interest of
natural justice you must divide with your neighbor so that he and his dependents
shall not become a charge upon the State' ". Minimum wages for women, said the
United States Supreme Court in 1923, "ignores the necessities of the employer,
generously leaving him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as
an alternative for going on at a loss. Certainly the employer by paying a fair equivalent for the service rendered, though not sufficient to support the employee, has
neither caused nor contributed to her poverty." Membership in a labor union is
not the personal and private affair of the employee, said the United States Supreme
Court in 1915. "The employer must be left at liberty to decide for himself whether
such membership by his employee is consistent with the satisfactory performance
of the duties of the employment. The employee has no inherent right to join the
union and still remain in the employ of one who is unwilling to employ a union
man." Child labor, said the United States Supreme Court in 1918, is "a matter
purely local in its character. If Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to
local authority, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the
States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government
be practically destroyed."
The Holmes approach to these dire predictions of destruction of our government and enervation of our constitution to a mere waste of words, was always the
same: "If the belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man,
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the courts must safeguard his right to entertain that belief. The wisdom of the
belief is not my concern." In 1915, the New York court considered "practical
experience as well as theory", found that "with the change in industrial conditions,
an opinion has gradually developed" in favor of workmen's compensation and
gave it judicial approval. In 1937, the United States Supreme Court found that
it had departed "from the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the State of the relation of employer and employee" in condemning
minimum wage legislation. "The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power casts a direct burden for their
support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are
called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met." In 1941, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act and found that its
earlier refusal to enforce child labor legislation "was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause before
and since." In 1949, the United States Supreme Court found that an employee had
the right to obtain and hold jobs free of discrimination against him because of
union or non-union m'embership.
Neither politically, economically nor sociologically does the United States of
today bear the slightest resemblance to the republic of the founding fathers. Drastic
changes were made in every branch of our law as we advanced from the horse and
buggy to the airplane, from a population of three millions to our present one
hundred and fifty millions. Not one of today's governmental restrictions on our
private lives and property would have been upheld by the Supreme Court of 1800.
They had hard sledding even with our own. That even our form of government
has strayed far from its origins is well-known. Individual rights and property
must always yield to the "general welfare". This has ever been an elastic term;
it encompasses all governmental activities thought by the majority to be "interwoven with the well-being of the Nation." It would support a communistic form
of government if the majority wished it and could show that it was in furtherance of the public welfare. In fact, we have had our own particular brand of "communism" for almost a decade. Employees are now, in a few states, entitled to sick
benefits from the state, even if their illness is unrelated to their employment. All
drivers of automobiles pay, through insurance premiums-which are compulsory
in some instances-for the negligent or reckless driving of others. In New York,
low rent housing for persons of low income is a constitutionally declared function
of government; all property owners pay for adequate housing for others. Passengers on New York City's subway system are carried at a loss to the city. The
deficit is mtt by real property taxes which thereby causes all property owners to
pay for the transportation of others. Even housewives now join commercial employers in paying for the old age benefits to which employees are entitled. Profitsharing between management and labor is now accepted industrial procedure.
These planks we have extracted from the "communistic propaganda" to which we
have been exposed for more than one hundred years. In 1829, the Working Men's
Party advocated that "great wealth be taken away from its possessors on the same
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principle that a sword or a pistol may be wrested from a robber." Its members
were called "ring-streaked and speckled rabble" by one of New York's leading
newspapers, which added that they "deserved nothing better than to die like
ravenous wild beasts, hunted down without pity." In 1840, Horace Greeley hired
Karl Marx as foreign correspondent for the New York Tribune. In 1886 a dynamite-filled bomb exploded during a labor riot at Haymarket Square, Chicago,
while four anarchists who were later hanged for the explosion shouted: "You
have nothing more to do with the law. Throttle it, kill it, stab it, do everything
you can to wound it." In 1919, an anti-Red hysteria swept this country, with its
concomitant Congressional investigations of Communistic propaganda and in the
seizure of hundreds of "radicals" in coast-to-coast raids, 249 "undesirables" were
deported to Russia. Legally elected Socialist legislators were barred from Congress
and the New York state legislature. No distinction was made between socialism
and communism. The prevailing opinion was "Socialism is Bolshevism with a
shave." From these thoughts that we hated when first expounded, came the concepts we now accept as if the founding fathers had handed them to us. Were our
form of government and our Constitution not so flexible, not so readily adaptable
to change, we should long since have had a "classless" society-the present Nirvana of the communists-or something equally obnoxious.
Our guardian angel throughout our history has been the freedom of expression we have granted to "the thought that we hate". The wisdom of this procedure is just as apparent in the realm of politics as in the field of economics. The
newcomer in politics, as in economics, may bring with him one idea we shall wish
to adopt. That he may also bring with him many ideas we do not wish to use does
not detract from the value to us of an open market for all ideas, political and economic. Except during our sporadic witch-hunting days, we have maintained an
open mind and an eager eye not only for the man who may be making the better
mousetrap but for the one who may be able to solve our never-ending societal
problems. The better mousetrap is more readily recognized and more rapidly accepted than its societal counterpart. The maker of the mousetrap need convince
only a small segment of our industrial community of the merit of his idea. The
sociological or political innovator must convince a majority of our entire population that his idea will solve a current societal problem. Therefore decades may
pass before his innovation is adopted. But he has always had the same free market
and opportunity for salesmanship as the inventor of economic goods and devices.
That fact cuts the ground from under those who argue that force of arms or other
violent means are necessary to effectuate political or sociological changes in this
country. They would be necessary for rapid changes, but not for the gradual changes
Americans prefer. They want their changes in small doses, with the opportunity
to assimilate one mouthful before asked to swallow another. The slower, persuasive method of change carries enough of the old concepts and ideas into the new
era to insure continuity between the old and the new. The new idea, therefore,
frequently seems merely the normal offshoot of the old, although it may be a
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radical departure from the old ideas as they were before "freedom for the thought
that we hate" started to work on them.
The evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment's negro equality provisions
illustrates the point. The Amendment was adopted in 1868. It prohibited unequal
treatment of persons declared in the Dred Scott decision of 1857 to be incapable
of recognition as "people", because they came of slave stock. With the force of
an atomic bomb, it shattered the opinion then "fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race" and "an axiom in morals as well as politics" that
neither they nor their descendants could ever be considered "people". The Amendment, if taken at its face, would be "mere brute force" said the United States
Supreme Court, as it proceeded to cushion the impact. In 1879, the court restricted
the Amendment to official state action. Private individuals and "subordinate"
state officials, it declared, may still discriminate against negroes. The Amendment
does not prohibit non-official inequality, such as lynching or the trial of a negro
for murder before a jury from which subordinates have excluded all negroes. "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment",
the Court repeated in 1883, when it held unconstitutional a congressional act entitling a negro to recover monetary damages for discrimination against him by proprietors of public inns, theatres, and conveyances. There is no "public interest"
in such treatment; that is a "matter purely of private concern", it said. Gradually
the difference between "individual" and "state" action was narrowed. In 1917,
city ordinances prohibiting negroes from living in a white residence area were
held to be state action interfering with a white man's right to sell or lease his property to whomever he wished, including negroes. But the "general or common law"
prohibition and restrictive covenants against such sales to negroes were still deemed
private affairs concerning only the individuals affected. So were refusals of state
political parties to permit negroes to vote in their primaries. In 1939, the exclusion
of negroes from grand and petit juries was held to be a violation of the Amendment, irrespective of the method of exclusion used or the official status of the excluder. In 1941, the Court ruled that negroes willing to pay the established rates
w'ere entitled to first-class railroad accommodations, even while the train was
passing through Jim Crow states; whether the discrimination was by "individual"
or "state" action was not considered. In 1944, the Court determined that "primary
elections are conducted by the party under state statutory authority", found that
refusal of the state political parties to permit negroes to participate in their primaries was a violation of the Amendment. In 1948, while adhering to its prior
determination that restrictive covenants against the sale of real property to negroes
was a private affair, the Court held that the use of state courts to enforce such
covenants was akin to state action and a violation of the Amendment. Not until
1950--eighty-two years after the adoption of the Amendment-was its prohibition
of unequal treatment fully recognized by the United States Supreme Court. State
colleges and universities, said the Court, must offer the same educational facilities
to negroes as to whites. Giving the same courses in a separate school for negroes
is not enough. They are entitled to sit in the same classrooms, use the same library,
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eat at the same cafeteria, have the same "opportunity to secure acceptance by their
fellow students on their own merits." The intangibles distingiushing one school
from another-reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige-must be available to negroes on the same terms as to the whites." Railroads
must remove their "curtains, partitions and signs" by which they attempt to segregate negroes and whites in their dining cars. There may be no racial classification
of passengers holding identical railroad tickets, the Supreme Court ruled.
All our political and economic concepts have undergone similar gradual
changes and are still undergoing them today. Always the cry is heard that the founding fathers would have objected to what we are about to do. When rent control
first came before the United States Supreme Court for enforcement in 1921, three
of its members declared that the Constitution thereby became "an archaeological
relic." They soliloquized: "If such exercise of government be legal, what exercise of government is illegal? If the public interest may be concerned with the control of any form of property, it can be concerned with the control of all forms of
property. If the public interest can extend a lease, it can compel a lease; the difference is only in degree and boldness." To such warnings that the commies
were on our trail, Justice Holmes again replied: "We have no concern with
whether rent control is wise or will effect the result desired. It is enough that we
are not warranted in saying that it is futile, or has no reasonable relation to the
relief sought."
When the "thought that we hate" includes a call to immediate change, to
force of arms or other violence to effectuate such change, entirely different principles are involved. Here the innovator goes beyond the market place of ideas, is
dissatisfied with the platform we make available to him and seeks not the substitution of a new idea for an old but force in place of our legislative and judicial
processes. In the United States, the use of force to accomplish a result is a governmental power which no individual may arrogate to himself, even to suppress
"subversive elements." The government may use force only when peaceful persuasion is ineffective; individuals may never use force except in self-defense. The
utterance of "the thought that we hate" is protected by that prohibition against
the use of force; without such restraint on individual conduct, the utterer would
frequently be in personal danger of audience assault. Advocacy of a doctrine that
"organiz-ed government should be overthrown by force or violence" has long been
a felony in New York. This is not one of the new ideas we are waiting to hear but
only an attempt to persuade law-abiding citizens to break the law. It is comparable
to an harangue of gangsters by their gang leader on the merits of burglary, arson,
murder. These are not thoughts that we hate; they are acts which are criminal because they prevent the orderly presentation, absorption, and adoption of ideas
for better community living. These ideas we want to hear about, even if they are
presently hateful to us. But there must not be linked with their presentation an
attempt to persuade us to become criminals and destroy the governmental processes which alone enable us to live out our lives in comparable peace and safety.

